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Need to Know: Analytical and
Psychological Criteria
Baruch Fischhoff*
The outcomes of many legal proceedings depend on whether
some people were adequately informed regarding risks that they
have taken. For example, medical malpractice suits may hinge on
whether patients provided informed consent to procedures. Prod-
uct liability suits may focus on the adequacy of consumer or opera-
tor warning labels. The managers of industrial facilities need to
get out the word regarding potential and actual accidents. One re-
sponse to this demand is routinely disseminating any information
that could conceivably be relevant to someone. Unfortunately, that
strategy ignores both the limits to recipients' overall information-
processing capacity and their difficulty with comprehending partic-
ular kinds of information. A general approach is offered here for
setting communication priorities and determining their adequacy.
INTRODUCTION
Individuals and organizations often bear a duty to inform
others whose welfare their actions can affect. Physicians must en-
sure that their patients understand the risks of taking and declin-
ing medical procedures. Pharmaceutical firms must do much the
same for potential consumers of their products. So must food
processors, although they typically need to say much less, except to
individuals in vulnerable populations (e.g., those with acute food
allergies). Firms and government agencies managing hazardous
facilities often must inform their neighbors (or nation) about the
health, safety and environmental risks that they create. The pen-
alties for adjudicated-or just perceived-failure to inform can be se-
* Professor, Department of Engineering and Public Policy and Department
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vere. They may include financial penalties, costly delays and
public censure (even incarceration, in rare cases).
A conceptually simple response to this duty is making availa-
ble any information that anyone could possibly want. Unfortu-
nately, that strategy is anything but practically simple for anyone
involved. Those who bear the duty could, conceivably, be held re-
sponsible for providing-and perhaps even creating-any imaginable
kind of evidence. Those who need to be informed face the chore of
sorting through any assemblage of facts that might be thrown at
them. At the end of the day, this policy provides neither providers
nor recipients the guidance and protection that they seek, while
creating needless burdens.1
Having ready access to all such information may be an impor-
tant legal right, even if it is rarely exercised. Knowing that access
is possible, firms may produce different risks. However, individu-
als facing specific choices are better served by a more practical
communication strategy: tell them what they most need to know;
stop when they know enough to make the decisions facing them.
The remainder of this article focuses on three examples of how this
strategy might be executed, drawing on the analytical and empiri-
cal tools of behavioral decision theory.2 Conceptualization of the
task involves the following steps: 1) Conduct a formal analysis of
the decision problem, identifying those facts, knowledge of which
would have the greatest impact on the expected utility of the deci-
sion for individuals who otherwise know nothing; 2) Determine
what the decision-makers already know; 3) Create and evaluate
communications providing the most important missing informa-
tion; 4) Compare post-communication knowledge with the accept-
able level of misunderstanding, given the legal and ethical
constraints of the situation.
1. See generally Jon F. Merz, On a Decision-Making Paradigm of Medical
Informed Consent, 14 J. Legal Med. 231 (1993) (speaking about the legal implica-
tions of informed consent in the medical and pharmaceutical fields); Jon F. Merz &
Baruch Fischhoff, Informed Consent Doesn't Mean Rational Consent: Cognitive
Limitations on Decision-Making, 11 J. Legal Med. 321 (1990) (explaining that the
use of decision analysis tools is a more appropriate way to establish what consti-
tutes adequate informed consent than using arbitrary legal definitions).
2. For general introductions to the field, see Scott Plous, The Psychology of
Judgment and Decision Making (1993); J. Frank Yates, Judgment and Decision
Making 1-13 (1990); Robyn M. Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World (Je-
rome Kagan ed., 1988); Detlof von Winterfeldt & Ward Edwards, Decision and Be-
havioral Research (1986).
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Although these steps could be followed in a linear process, it
may be appropriate to cycle back at any point. For example, if un-
derstanding is inadequate (step 4), then communications must be
improved (step 3). If it is unclear how to communicate a critical
detail (step 3), then further study of decision-maker beliefs is war-
ranted (step 2). If studying those beliefs reveals a misspecification
in the formal model, then it must be amended (e.g., in order to in-
clude a consequence that the modelers have neglected, but deci-
sion-makers describe as a matter of concern).
These steps are, of course, the basis of any conscientious com-
munication act.3 Even in casual conversation, one attempts to
identify things that others need to know and to say them so that
they will be understood as intended, recognizing that new
messages are interpreted in the context of existing beliefs. Obvi-
ously, the chances of initial success increase to the extent that
one's conversation partners are familiar and they share knowledge
about the topic. The chances of eventual success increase to the
extent that there are opportunities for trial-and-error learning.
These include receiving prompt, unambiguous feedback and incen-
tives for improved understanding (e.g., feeling free to admit being
confused or having misspoken).
These conditions are not always achieved, even with long-time
friends and conversation partners. Official communications often
face much less favorable conditions. Those bearing the duty to in-
form may know a topic inside-out, while their audience knows lit-
tle, sometimes not even enough to appreciate the importance of
attending to the issues. Beyond their differential familiarity with
the specific topic, communicators and audience may come from dif-
ferent linguistic communities, reflecting their professional train-
ing, socioeconomic status, analytical orientation and even native
language. These differences may also restrict their willingness to
express concern, confusion or irritation to one another, as well as
3. For good sources for discussions of conversational norms, see H. Paul
Grice, Logic and Conversation, in The Logic of Grammar, 64-75 (Donald Davidson
& Gilbert Harman eds., 1976). See generally Nobert Schwartz, Self-Reports: How
the Questions Shape the Answers, 54 Am. Psychologist 93 (1999) (explaining how
the wording, format and context of research questions can influence research
results).
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the pace with which understanding increases, even when they do
express these feelings. 4
The learning process is further slowed (or stalled completely)
when there is no direct contact between the parties-as can happen
with the designers of chemical warning labels, public health pam-
phlets, patient package inserts, equipment instructions, website
privacy notices and the like. There may be no evaluation at all or
nothing more than sporadic reports with unclear sampling biases
(e.g., calls to an 800 number, problems that happen to reach a sur-
veillance system). Whatever evidence is collected still may not
make it back to the communication designers, either at all or in
time for them to learn very much. Even when catastrophic failures
reach the courts or news media, the message is often garbled
(sometimes deliberately). Moreover, the attribution of failure is a
difficult task with complex systems. Inadequate communications
may be the breaking point for systems that are so poorly designed
that no message could have prevented disaster. They are a readily
visible target for criticism, much in the way that "operator error"
can be. Even when communications are properly held accountable,
the lesson may not be very specific. It may be just "do better" or,
even worse, "In the future, cover yourself by saying everything that
could possibly be relevant."
Hiding known problems or uncertainties cannot be condoned,
whether they pose material risks or reduce the value of a product
or procedure. However, saying everything may have little more
practical value than saying nothing. Unless the list is fortuitously
short, such a "core dump" violates the norms of communication by
failing to focus on what the audience most needs to know and can
process in a limited time. It may violate those norms further if the
desire for technical precision overrides the desire for comprehensi-
4. For general sources on the gaps between expert and lay communities see
Baruch Fischhoff, Cancer Risk Communication: What We Know and What We Need
to Learn, 25 J. Natl Cancer Inst. Monographs 7 (1999) [hereinafter Fischhoff I];
Baruch Fischhoff, Communicate Unto Others ... , 59 Reliability Engineering & Sys.
Safety 63 (1998) [hereinafter Fischhoff II]; National Research Council, Committee
on Risk Characterization, Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Edu-
cation, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society (Paul C.
Stern & Harvey V. Finberg eds., 1996); Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Perception and
Communication Unplugged, Twenty Years of Progress, 15 Risk Analysis 137
(1995); William Leiss & Christina Chociolko, Risk and Responsibility 34-38 (1994);
National Research Council, Committee on Risk Perception and Communication,
Improving Risk Communication (1989) [hereinafter National Research Council I].
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bility. Such an imbalance may reflect organizational processes as
well as legal ones. Creating a product requires technical expertise,
but not necessarily communication skill. The latter may be an af-
terthought, involving low-status individuals, asked to paper-over
whatever problems the technical specialists failed to resolve. In
that way, their role would be little different than that of other
"human factors" experts in many design processes.5
Communication specialists themselves might be faulted if they
failed to translate their expertise into terms compatible with the
frame of reference for subject matter specialists. Living in largely
separate worlds would contribute to such a gap, as would the quali-
tative nature of many social science theories. They predict the rel-
ative likelihood of behavior in different circumstances, rather than
absolute performance levels. Even the rancorous debate over the
extent of human rationality seldom addresses the question of what
level is adequate in specific circumstances.6 Nonetheless, the so-
cial sciences offer tools that can direct and evaluate efforts to in-
form. Although they draw on general principles, these tools
respect the details of specific particular settings. The remainder of
this article is devoted primarily to three worked examples, draw-
ing on somewhat different methods and addressing somewhat dif-
ferent contexts. The first considers medical informed consent, the
second product warning labels and the third emergency systems.
Each example focuses on the critical first step of the process out-
lined above: identifying information needs. It then sketches the
behavioral research needed to establish what people know already,
to design appropriate communications and to evaluate their
adequacy.
INFORMED CONSENT FOR MEDICAL PROCEDURES
7
In some jurisdictions, physicians are held to a professional
standard: they need to say what their peers say. Although they
5. For good sources on design failures, see Donald A. Norman, The Design of
Everyday Things (1990); Thomas K. Landauer, The Trouble With Computers: Use-
fulness, Usability, and Productivity 7, 128-40, 246 (1995); Stephen M. Casey, Set
Phasers on Stun: And Other True Tales of Design, Technology and Human Error
(1993).
6. For a recent, relatively nonpartisan summary, see Keith E. Stanovich,
Who is Rational: Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning (1999).
7. See Jon F. Merz, Toward a Standard of Disclosure for Medical Informed
Consent: Development and Demonstration of Decision-Analytic Methodology
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pool the judgments of a community, professional standards can
also entrench flawed practices. That risk may be particularly large
when there are few opportunities for systematic feedback and eval-
uation. Other jurisdictions have a materiality standard: physi-
cians must say whatever is "material" to their patients' decisions.
One way to implement this demand is to provide a laundry list of
possible side effects. As in the pasta sauce ad, everything that one
could possible want is "in there," somewhere. However, that form
of assurance may be of little value to patients-whose time, energy
and cognitive capacity are all limited.
If materiality is interpreted as focusing on what people most
need to know, then it might be operationalized in value-of-informa-
tion analysis terms.8 That is, information is material to the extent
that receiving it affects the expected utility of recipients' choices.
These analytical procedures are typically applied to the decisions
faced by individuals (with the wherewithal to command such at-
tention). That requires eliciting their personal beliefs and values,
regarding possible consequences of possible actions. The impact of
additional information can be evaluated relative to this baseline
(considering the costs of its acquisition, when the individual would
bear them). For communications directed at a broad audience,
that evaluation must consider the impacts aggregated over individ-
uals like those who would receive it. Table 19 shows the results of
such an analysis, applied to a common medical procedure.
Carotid endarterechtomy involves scraping out the artery
leading to the brain. It can reduce the risk of stroke for patients
with arteriosclerosis there. However, many things can go wrong,
as seen in the list of Table 1, which includes only the most serious
ones. That many things would be a lot to consider, especially
under the stress of a life-threatening illness. These risks must be
balanced against the possible positive consequences of the surgery
(not shown in Table 1), namely, increased quality and quantity of
life.
(1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University) (on file with
author). For a summary, see Jon F. Merz et al., Decision-Analytic Approach to
Deueloping Standards of Disclosure for Medical Informed Consent, 15 J. Products
& Toxics Liab. 191 (1993).
8. See Robert T. Clemen, Making Hard Decisions: An Introduction to Deci-
sion Analysis 352,358, 400-01 (1991); Howard Reiffa, Decision Analysis: Introduc-
tory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty 42-47 (1968).
9. See infra app., tbl.1.
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The analytical results in Table 1 reflect one way to set infor-
mation priorities. It uses Monte Carlo procedures to create a hypo-
thetical population of patients, for all of whom the surgery would
be a rational choice were there no risks (and were money no ob-
ject). These patients vary in their physical condition, represented
by probability distributions over possible consequences (indicating
the expected variation in their response to the surgery). They also
vary in their values, represented by distributions of utilities for
those consequences. The Monte Carlo procedures create individual
patients by sampling values from these distributions. 10 Each pa-
tient is characterized by a combination of physical states and per-
sonal values. Standard procedures11 are used to calculate the
expected utility of the surgery decision for each such patient, ignor-
ing all risks. 12 By definition, it is positive because these patients
are all better off with the surgery. The expected utility is recalcu-
lated, including knowledge of the probability of a possible conse-
quence, as estimated by medical research. The materiality of that
information is captured in how much it reduces the expected utility
of the surgery. If it changes from positive to negative, then the
surgery is no longer recommended. The most important informa-
tion is, arguably, that regarding the risk that would make the most
patients decline the surgery.
In the example of Table 1, about 15% such patients should de-
cline the surgery, upon learning the probability of immediate
death.13 Another 5% should decline, if told the risk of iatrogenic
stroke.14 An additional 3% should be dissuaded by hearing the
risk of facial paralysis. 15 Thus, although many other side effects
are possible, few would affect many choices. In communication
terms, although the set of potentially relevant facts is large, the set
of critically relevant ones is small.
Conveying those facts means ensuring that recipients under-
stand both the probability and the nature of each event. Some will
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Expected utility for the surgery equals the sum of the expected utility for
each possible consequence, which is equal to the product of its probability and
utility.
13. See infra app., tbl.l.
14. See id.
15. See id.
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be easier than others.16 In this example, the probabilities of the
three focal side effects are large enough to be readily compre-
hended (rather than, say, thousandths of a per-cent). Moreover,
whether they occur is resolved at one time, avoiding the difficulty
that people have in seeing how risks accumulate through repeated
exposure. Furthermore, given even rudimentary knowledge of the
surgery, it is not hard to imagine these events occurring, so that
patients can create a mental model that affords meaning and credi-
bility to the statistical information. Thus, given what is known
about the strengths and weaknesses of lay judgment under uncer-
tainty, these should be relatively comprehensible probabilities.
The nature of the two top side effects (death and stroke)
should be familiar, especially to candidates for this procedure, who
face these possibilities already. (Regarding the meaning of death,
there may not be that much that a medical professional could add
in any case-beyond a description of the speed and pain of the im-
mediate circumstances.) Thus, even a limited communication op-
portunity might allow focusing on what the third side effect (facial
nerve paralysis) is like.
The example in the box assumes patients who know nothing
about the probabilities of the possible outcomes. That seems rea-
sonable for an unfamiliar surgery. For patients with prior beliefs,
the analysis would consider how different facts would update those
priors. Those priors could be elicited directly or derived theoreti-
cally. For example, reliance on the availability heuristic should
lead to underestimating the probability of events that have never
been mentioned; reliance on the representativeness heuristic
might lead to underestimating risks that do not seem like natural
16. For reviews of research into understanding and communicating risks, see
Fischhoff I, supra note 4; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioral-
ism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 630 (1999)
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar I]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar 11]; Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Percep-
tion and Communication, in Oxford Textbook of Public Health 987-1002 (Roger
Detels et al. eds., 1997); Howard Leventhal et al., Illness Cognition: Using Com-
mon Sense to Understand Treatment Adherence and Affect Cognition Interactions,
16 Cognitive Therapy & Res. 143 (1992); National Research Council I, supra note
4; Paul Slovic, Perceptions of Risk, 236 Science 280, 280-85 (1987).
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outgrowths of the procedure. 17 (Facial paralysis might qualify on
both grounds.)
In either case, the analysis creates a supply curve, showing the
optimal order for providing new facts. That order would change if
some important facts proved too hard to communicate. De-empha-
sizing them saves recipients' time-while acknowledging that less
overall understanding is possible. The order should also change if
some facts proved redundant, so that those patients who know one
fact can predict the others. With the sort of artificial tasks
presented in psychological experiments, any two features can ap-
pear together (e.g., the sizes and probabilities of the gains and
losses in lab gambles), allowing no such efficiencies. However,
when evaluating real events, patients may already have many be-
liefs and be quick to infer more. If they guess right, even a short
description may communicate a lot.
Thus, efficient pursuit of this strategy would require assessing
the beliefs that individuals bring to the task, regarding both the
outcomes and the processes that lead to them. The search for such
cognitive connections has prompted the study of lay mental models
for many domains.18 A typical finding is that people organize di-
verse facts into highly flexible templates (e.g., how the circulatory
system works, how the body processes toxins, how hazardous
chemicals flow through groundwater, how risks mount up through
repeated exposure). Most such studies contrast observed behavior
with a normative standard. For decisions under uncertainty, with
complex, loosely bounded problems, that standard can be captured
in an influence diagram, showing the factors determining the
probabilities appearing in the associated decision tree.19 The con-
trast between lay beliefs and these models has guided the develop-
ment of communications on many topics, including radon, climate
17. See Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
18. See, e.g., Phillip N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models: Towards A Cognitive
Science Of Language, Inference and Consciousness (1983); Frederic C. Bartlett,
Remembering: A Study In Experimental and Social Psychology (1961); William B.
Rouse & Nancy M. Morris, On Looking Into the Black Box, Prospects and Limits in
the Search for Mental Models, 100 Psychol. Bull. 349 (1937); Edward C. Tolman,
Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men (1932).
19. See Clemen, supra note 8; Baruch Fischhoff et al., Adolescent Vulnerabil-
ity: A Framework For Behavioral Interventions, 7 Applied Preventative Psychol.
77, 80 (1998); Robert A. Howard, Knowledge Maps, 35 Mgmt. Sci. 903, 903-05
(1989).
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change, oil spills, electromagnetic fields, mammography, HIV/
AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases and nuclear energy in
space. 20 These procedures are available for medical informed
consent. 2
1
PRODUCT WARNING LABELS
2 2
A necessary condition for an efficient market place is that po-
tential users of a product be able to understand its risks and bene-
fits well enough to determine whether buying it is in their own best
interests. When those conditions are lacking, a case can be made
for regulatory protection. That may happen as a result of deceptive
packaging or advertising.23 However, it can also occur when peo-
ple are left to their own devices, with no effort being made to ad-
dress their "naive" misunderstanding. Products may just seem
safer or more beneficial than they actually are. In the absence of
remedial information, people will, in effect, mislead themselves.
Product warning labels often bear the onus of the duty to in-
form. If they effectively communicate an acceptable level of risk,
then they can free individuals to use products that bring them de-
sired benefits, while avoiding any extra costs of regulation that
might be passed on to them. Where individuals can exercise con-
trol over their exposures, appropriate information can help them
reduce their own risk (e.g., by using protective equipment or proce-
dures), perhaps bringing it into the acceptable-risk range, perhaps
increasing their net benefit from an already acceptable product.
Evaluating the adequacy of labels means estimating the risks that
will be experienced by people expected to rely on them, making re-
alistic assumptions about human behavior. There is a great deal of
20. See Fischhoff II, supra note 4, at 69. See, e.g., Granger Morgan et al., Risk
Communication: The Mental Models Approach (forthcoming 2001) (on file with au-
thor); Baruch Fischhoff, Diagnosing Stigma, 59 Reliability Engineering and Sys.
Safety 47 (1998); Ann Bostrom et al., Characterizing Mental Models of Hazardous
Processes: A Methodology and an Application to Radon, 48 J. Soc. Issues 85 (1992).
21. See Fischhoff I, supra note 4, at 7.
22. See generally Donna M. Riley et al., Modeling Methylene Chloride
Exposure-Reduction Options For Home Paint-Stripper Use, 10 J. Exposure
Analysis & Envtl. Epidemiology 240, 240-50 (2000) (evaluating a general
methodology for the effectiveness of behavioral interventions for the risk of
exposure to dangerous household chemicals).
23. See generally Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 16, at 630 (discussing market
manipulation and the need for corrective legal devices); Hanson & Kysar II, supra
note 16, at 1420 (presenting empirical evidence of market manipulation).
NEED TO KNOW
research literature on what draws people's attention to labels.24
For example, studies have found that consumers are most likely to
read the first few sentences at the top of the back panel25 or in the
directions section. 26 Bolded words add emphasis and draw atten-
tion.27 Such studies form one input to estimating the risks
achieved with particular warning labels.
Household chemicals represent one large domain in which con-
sumer understanding can be critical and modeling of exposure is
possible. Figure 128 shows one set of results, produced by a model
predicting cumulative exposures to methylene chloride, the active
ingredient in most paint stripper formulations. Such exposures
have been related to carcinogenicity and suspected of other effects;
peak exposures can lead to heart attacks, through the build-up of
carbon monoxide in the work area.29 They can be estimated with
the same model (not shown here). The model was initially devel-
oped from physical principles (of air circulation and chemistry) and
then calibrated under laboratory conditions. 30 Assumptions about
the effects of plausible user behavior were added, incorporating re-
sults from twenty interviews conducted at a home improvement
center.31
This particular example reflects a typical job, conducted in a
small workroom. The model is, however, general enough to accom-
modate other jobs, rooms, chemicals and work practices. The de-
clining lines in the figure show the "best buys" in exposure
reduction, as those emerged from analysis of various possibilities.
They show the marginal benefit of each step for reducing exposure,
as well as their combination. The gray lines show full compliance,
24. See generally Selections from Human Factors and Ergonomics Society An-
nual Meetings 1980-1993 (Kenneth R. Laughery, Sr. et al. eds., 1994) (compiling a
number of papers on different types of warnings and their impact on consumers).
25. See Keyla Friedmann, The Effect of Adding Symbols to Written Warning
Labels on User Behavior and Recall, 30 Hum. Factors 507, 514-15 (1988).
26. See J. Paul Frantz, Effect of Location and Procedural Explicitness on User
Processing of and Compliance with Product Warnings, 36 Hum. Factors 532, 543-
45 (1994).
27. See Judy Edworthy & Austin S. Adams, Warning Design: A Research Pro-
spective 25-46 (1997).
28. See infra app., fig.1.
29. See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Methylene Chlo-
ride Toxicity, 47 Am. Faro. Physician 1159, 1161 (1993).
30. See John R. Girman et al., Considerations in Evaluating Emissions from
Consumer Products, 21 Atmospheric Env't 315, 315-20 (1987).
31. See id.
2000]
66 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:55
while the dark lines show partial compliance. Thus, in this small
room, full compliance with opening windows and taking breaks
would be equally effective. However, partially opening windows is
much better than partially taking breaks. Full breaks add some-
thing to opening windows, while partial breaks do not. Adding a
fan makes a big difference, even with partially opened windows.
Thus, if (small room) consumers cannot realistically be expected to
take diligent breaks, then that strategy should not be emphasized.
Rather, instructions should stress ventilation, where imperfect ef-
forts can make a big difference. (The flammability of some formu-
lations of paint removers does mean that this message would have
to specify a non-sparking fan.)
What users will do, in the absence of instructions, is an empir-
ical question which can be answered in various imperfect ways. In
principle, observing users' behavior should provide the most realis-
tic estimates. However, such observation can be reactive, with peo-
ple behaving differently (and probably more cautiously) when they
know that others are watching. Interviews are another option, fac-
ing some of the same measurement issues. For example, Kovacs,
Small, Davidson and FischhoffP2 found that fewer than 5% of sub-
jects even looked at the precautionary statement on the back label
of a chemical cleaner in an experimental setting; nonetheless, in a
post-experiment questionnaire, 18% reported having read the label
during the experiment, while 76% reported that they "normally
read" labels.33 Nonetheless, carefully collected data, following the
norms of social research and attempting to reduce reactivity, can
discipline speculations. Moreover, such research can provide some
protection against self-serving desires to envision users as particu-
larly sloppy or savvy (e.g., to justify regulation or deregulation,
respectively).
In lieu of such data, one can still get some idea of exposures by
presuming different label-reading patterns. Figures 2a-d34 follow
this strategy. They show the expected inhalation dose of methy-
lene chloride, for individuals performing a common paint-stripping
task, in a medium-sized room with moderate ventilation. Each fig-
32. See Daniel C. Kovacs, et al., Behavioral Factors Affecting Exposure Poten-
tial for Household Cleaning Products, 7 J. Exposure Analysis and Envtl. Epidemi-
ology 505 (1997).
33. See id.
34. See infra app., figs.2a-d.
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ure makes different assumptions about users' reading habits.
Each curve refers to the label of a product taken off the shelves of a
home improvement store. Figure 2a assumes that users read the
first five items on the labels of six different products (taken from
the shelves of a local hardware store), and then follow those direc-
tions perfectly. Clearly, Product B does a much better job than the
others, for users with these reading habits. That advantage van-
ishes for users who read only the text emphasized on a label (Fig.
2b) or only the directions (with all labels performing equally
poorly) (Fig. 2c). For those (rare?) users who read everything,
there is virtually no exposure at all with product A; the labels for
B, D, and E produce exposures like those for B in the figure; prod-
ucts C and F perform no better (Fig. 2d).
The analyses of Figure 235 assume complete compliance with
what users read. How far that happens will depend on the details
of the design. In addition to rendering these instructions clear and
persuasive, labels might increase compliance by communicating
the ineffectiveness of the gloves and breathing aids that many peo-
ple use. Those provide little protection; indeed, many gloves are
dissolved by the solvent. Such measures might even increase expo-
sures, if they create a false sense of security, encouraging users to
remain in work areas longer than they otherwise would. Doing
less of one (ineffective) thing might encourage doing more of an-
other (effective) one, for individuals willing to invest a fixed
amount of money or energy in risk management. Instructing con-
sumers about the properties of different glove materials will be dif-
ficult. As a result, if the use of gloves is to be improved, an
engineering or marketing solution may be needed. For example,
appropriate gloves might be packaged together with the chemical,
while inappropriate gloves are explicitly labeled "not suitable for
paint stripping." An even better bit of advice might be advocating
the use of goggles. Those currently on the market effectively pro-
tect against splatter injuries. In addition to citing the frequency of
such accidents, motivating instructions might ask consumers to ex-
amine the splatter patterns on their own work clothing, as well as
noting that these goggles are suited for multiple use (unlike the
dissolving gloves).
35. See id.
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How well any of this will work is an empirical question. Ar-
guably, relevant data should be collected by those who advocate for
fault regulatory or voluntary risk-management practices. Where
task-specific data are lacking, one should rely on research-based
principles, rather than on mere supposition. Those predictions of
behavior should be interpreted in the context of a formal model,
relating them to exposures, showing just what risks are associated
with the practices. Some failings matter a lot less than others.
Such analyses allow juries, regulators, politicians and others to de-
cide whether realistic use patterns create an acceptable level of
risk. They allow producers and merchants to decide whether they
want to live with those exposures, even if they are deemed legal or
still want improved designs.
EMERGENCY SYSTEMS
3 6
Public and private officials often bear a special duty to inform,
when otherwise benign (or beneficial) systems dramatically misbe-
have. Expressions of that duty can be seen in the emergency warn-
ing procedures of industrial facilities, fire departments,
commercial airlines and disaster management agencies, among
others. The effectiveness of these procedures depends on how
quickly warnings reach their intended audience, and how well they
are understood and followed. These, too, are empirical questions,
whose answers require the ability to predict human behavior in
specific settings. Figure 337 shows a formal model designed to do
that for Cryptosporidium, a protozoan parasite that can infect pub-
lic water supplies.38 It was responsible for a massive outbreak in
Milwaukee during 1994, which killed about 100 people and sick-
ened some 400,000.
Cryptosporidium, found in most surface waters, is shed
through the feces of infected humans and animals in the form of
oocysts-spheroidal, environmentally resistant eggs about three to
36. The research reported here is presented in full in Elizabeth Casman et al.,
Integrated Risk Model of a Drinking Waterborne Crytosporidiosis Outbreak, 20
Risk Analysis 493 (2000).
37. See infra app., fig.3.
38. See Charles N. Haas et al., Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment 150-
51 (1999).
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five microns in diameter.3 9 It enters the water supply through
human sewage effluent discharges and fecally contaminated storm
water runoff. Most forms of modem drinking water treatment,
such as sand filtration and chlorination, cannot fully remove or de-
activate oocysts in the water.40 As a result, Cryptosporidium occa-
sionally finds its way into tap water. Its symptoms appear after a
one to seven day incubation period, and include nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea, stomach cramps and a low-grade fever. Although there
is currently no medicine to treat the disease, many infected indi-
viduals exhibit no symptoms, or have them pass within two weeks.
However, the disease can be fatal in immunocompromised persons,
such as those with AIDS, for whom the death rate can be over
50%.41
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
considers Cryptosporidium to be one of the most serious problems
in United States drinking water today [EPA 815-F-98-00141. Re-
cent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have led to additional regu-
lations.42 In 1998, when Cryptosporidium oocysts and Giardia
cysts were detected in the drinking water of Sydney, Australia, me-
dia reports led millions of city and regional residents to become
angry, fearful and distrustful of their drinking water.43 Many
claimed to have become ill from drinking Sydney tap water, al-
though not a single case of cryptosporidiosis or giardiasis was actu-
ally confirmed. In fact, some environmental consultants now
believe that there were no extra oocysts and cysts in the water at
all. Rather, poor quality control had produced a "false positive" de-
tection. The episode cost tens of millions of dollars for the ensuing
public inquiry and liability settlements, caused the resignations of
both the Chairman and the Managing Director of the Sydney
39. See generally Ronald Fayer, Cryptosporidium and Cryptosporidiosis
(1997) (comparing and compiling research conducted concerning cryptosporidium
and cryptosporidiosis).
40. See Michelle M. Frey et al., Cryptosporidium: Answers to Questions Com-
monly Asked by Drinking Water Professionals 29-35 (AWWA Research Foundation
and American Water Works Association eds., 1997).
41. See Joan B. Rose, Environmental Ecology of Cryptosporidium and Public
Health Implications, 18 Annual Review of Public Health 135 (1997).
42. See Frey, supra note 40.
43. See generally Steve E. Hrudey, The Sydney Water Crisis (1999), available
at http/i/www.ucalgary.ca/~wleiss/news/sydney-watercrisis.htm (last visited Dec.
18, 2000) (describing media attention and criticism of handling 1998 water crisis in
Sydney, Australia).
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Water Corporation and set off proposals to subject the Sydney
Water Corporation to greater ministerial control.44
Figure 3 shows the complex of physical, biological and social
factors that determine the extent of outbreak risk. It has the form
of an influence diagram. In it, each node represents a variable.
Two nodes are connected if knowing the value of one (at the tail of
the arrow) improves predictions for the value of the other. Thus,
for example, the extent of utility awareness of a potential outbreak
predicts the chances of special studies being conducted or a joint
task force (of relevant agencies) being created. Estimating these
risks requires inputs from microbiology (for dose-response relation-
ships), civil engineering (filtration and testing), ecology (land use),
communications (attention to "boil water" notices) and psychology
(perceived risk, actual response), among other disciplines. The
computational version of this model specifies values for each varia-
ble and dependency, as experienced at a particular site. In some
cases, those estimates are extracted from empirical studies; in
others, they are but expert judgments.
This model was created as the integrating core of a project fo-
cused on reducing cryptosporidium risks through better communi-
cation with water consumers. However, running it revealed that
current testing procedures are so ineffective that an outbreak is
likely to have passed (or at least peaked) before its source is de-
tected. Basically, it takes too long to culture the parasite. As a
result, even if the communication system worked perfectly and
consumers did exactly as told, an emergency management system
that relied on "boil water" notices would fail to protect the most
vulnerable. Under these circumstances, vulnerable populations
require other forms of protection, such as routine provision of bot-
tled water. The resources available for notification might be better
spent on developing and installing improved detection procedures.
Were such detection mechanisms in place, the model predicts
that the quality of communications should make a difference in re-
ducing health risks. For example, if the institutional coordination
mechanisms shown in the figure work as planned, they could get a
message out quickly and consistently, increasing its credibility.
The content of the message would need to convey (a) that all public
44. See Jennifer L. Clancy, Sydney's 1998 Water Quality Crisis, 92 J. AWWA
55, 62, 64 (2000).
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water is potentially affected, (b) that all uses pose danger (even
small ones, like tooth brushing), and (c) what boiling water entails.
As examples of the kinds of misunderstandings that are possible,
interviews with Pittsburgh-area residents found such beliefs as,
"I'd let the tap run a couple of hours, and then it'll be clear," and, "I
think only cold water would have to be boiled." Generally speak-
ing, HIV+ respondents had greater awareness and understanding
of these issues than did others, even though they were predomi-
nantly sampled from areas that had had waterborne disease
problems.45
Although not that helpful for managing immediate emergen-
cies, current testing procedures might still produce results that
help with managing future ones. A definitive (forensic) diagnosis
of "what hit them" in a past outbreak might help citizens to decide
what to do about policies affecting future risks (e.g., regulating
land use, investing in filtration systems).
EVALUATING COMMUNICATIONS
In a sense, the details of these examples are immaterial. Even
were these three topics of specific interest, a real application would
require updating their estimates to accommodate the latest re-
search regarding the model's components, as well as being tailored
to behavioral observations with individuals like those in the target
audience. Rather, the examples were chosen to demonstrate the
kinds of conclusions that are possible. These include potentially
discovering that vital resources are invested in communicating
facts of little practical value, that critical facts are missing entirely
from communications intended to protect recipients, that chosen
facts are not formulated comprehensibly or that communication is
pointless in a system that is fundamentally unsound. Where
health and safety (or even "just" money) are at stake, such analy-
ses might be considered the "standard of care," to which those ex-
posed are entitled. Failing to conduct such systematic evaluations
might be taken as evidence of "negligence," just as appropriate
analyses might be taken as evidence of "due diligence." These
terms are used here in an informal sense, with an invitation to the
45. See F. Wu et al., Cryptosporidium Risk Communication: An Analysis of
What People Know, and What They Need to Know (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
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legal community to consider the status of these claims in tort and
regulatory law.
Such analyses are not the norm today. Among other things,
they require uncommon coordination of disciplines and collection of
evidence. Nonetheless, the additional effort might be acceptable to
risk managers, insofar as it provides a procedurally predictable
way to address a perennial problem. Responsible parties might be
willing (even eager) to make the investment, if it conferred protec-
tion in the court of law or the court of public opinion. Even without
those threats, risk managers might be happy taking better advan-
tage of current natural and social science in accomplishing their
life's work.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
A MATERIALITY STANDARD FOR PRIORITIZING
INFORMATION FOR MEDICAL
INFORMED CONSENT4 6
The percentage of a simulated patient population that would decline
carotid endarterechtomy, upon learning of each risk.
Percentage declining
Risk (standard deviation)
Death
Stroke & neurological deficit
Facial Nerve paralysis
MI (myocardial infarction)
Lung damage
Headache
Resurgery
Tracheostomy
Gastrointestinal upset
Broken teeth
Liver damage
Parotiditis
Kidney dysfunction
15.0 (0.3)
5.0 (0.2)
3.0 (0.2)
1.1 (0.1)
0.9 (0.06)
0.8 (0.1)
0.4 (0.03)
0.2 (0.03)
0.09 (0.1)
0.01 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
0.01 (0.01)
46. Merz, supra note 1, at 231-64.
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FIGuRE 1
SMALL WORKROOM PID-FuLL AND
PARTLL COMPLIANCE 4 7
-= 3
Z0 2
PID = Potential Inhalation Dose, a measure of cumulative exposure, in terms of
grams inhaled.
47. Donna M. Riley, Human Factors in Exposure Analysis for Consumer Paint
Stripper Use (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie Mellon University)
(on file with author).
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FIGURE 2A
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FIGURE 2B
READING EMPHASIZED TExT (SCENARIO 2) 4 9
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FIGURE 2c
READING DIRECTIONS ONLY (ScENARio 3)50
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FIGURE 2D
READING FULL LABEL (SCENARIo 4)51
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FIGuRE 3
EXPERT MODEL OF WATERBORNE
CRYPTOSPORIDIOSIS OUTBREAK
5 2
52. Elizabeth Casman et al., supra note 36.

